To what extent is the character of contemporary conflict distinctive?- with reference to Mary Kaldor

[This blog post is an edited essay of mine from my final year at University of Birmingham©]

Mary Kaldor’s ‘New Wars’ thesis argues that ‘new wars’ are distinctive from ‘old wars’ by their differences primarily in goals, methods of warfare and sources of finance. I will argue that her theory is an incorrect analysis to use as a guide for decision-making and policy-research because of its many inconsistencies. Kaldor offers some useful insight into modern warfare but the distinctions she makes are only accurate to some extent, such as when she details globalisation and state failure as some of the causes and processes of warfare. Her analysis of war must be fully explained in order to critically evaluate its accuracy and usefulness to determine any substantial distinctions.

Kaldor considers new wars to be post-Cold World War and that “during the 1980s and 1990s, a new type of organized violence has developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe, which is one aspect of the current globalized era.” (Kaldor, 1999, p1). Her New Wars thesis explains how these wars have come about through the ‘collapsing of external supporting mechanisms’ within ‘weak states’ and thus the central characteristics of warfare is distinct from older wars. She explains that “new wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals).” (Kaldor, 1999, p2). Kaldor believes that the goals of older wars were a collective and geopolitical ideology that attempted to build a better state for themselves. War would be interstate and fought with large and strategic national armies that would capture territories and usually be financed through a wartime economy and heavy taxation, “In conventional or regular war, the goal is the capture of territory by military means; battles are the decisive encounters of war.” (Kaldor, 1999, p7). This is in contrast to newer forms of warfare in which battles are intrastate and privately fought, having identity-based or ambiguous aims. Instead of state-building, they are ‘state-toppling’ as territorial capture is achieved through “political control of the population…and battles are avoided” (Kaldor, 1999, p8), mainly observed within guerrilla warfare. This, she demonstrates, is where distinctions can be made between old and new methods of war. Old wars used conventional tactics and combatants were always separate from civilians. Whereas with new war methods, civilians are increasingly killed or forcibly displaced, which she argues is intentionally done, stating that “military to civilian casualties is approximately 1:8” (Kaldor, 1999, p8) in more recent times. She reinstates that this is because of a disintegration of authority in newer wars which in turn blurs the division between private and public combatants and with civilians. The final main contrast she makes is that older wars financed their warfare externally and through taxation (if it was a state) and thus their economy was “centralized, totalizing and autarchic.” (Kaldor, 1999, p9). Whereas new wars have a decentralised and illicit economy where finances are internally gained “through plunder and the black market or through external assistance.” (Kaldor, 1999, p9). There are certain subtle differences between older and newer wars that can be observed and acknowledged, so it can be said that to a limited extent, Kaldor is accurate in her theory.

Some believe her analysis is relevant for important policies and decisions surrounding development, safety and conflict. This is because she highlights the roles state failure and social transformation have due to new liberal economics and globalisation on newly emerging wars. However it only offers some insight to an extent. It can be observed that in many contemporary wars “state-building efforts (are) crushed between traditional tribalism and postmodern globalization... (so they have) no opportunities to achieve development and the necessary degree of robustness.” (Münkler, 2005, p9-10) which aids the perpetuation of war in these societies. However, her theory only really resonates within corrupt and ‘third world’ warfare “in which state revenues decline because of the decline in the economy as well as the spread of criminality…violence is increasingly privatised both as a result of growing organized crime and the emergence of paramilitary groups…” (Kaldor, 1999, p5). It can be said that these wars seem to have ‘no end’ as they rely “upon an ideological ally or a strategically interested regime, or by gaining new access to the new forms of shadow globalization.” (Münkler, 2005, p10). Many recent wars involve the corruption and manipulation of the economy, which Kaldor states is because they are ‘mutual enterprises’, rather than in old wars that would have a decisive end. Naturally, warfare will always differ when powerful and fully developed countries engage in conflict than when poorer developing countries do. Her distinctions are more likely to be relevant if she categorised contemporary conflict by economic standing, not just whether it is old or new. There are some differences between most wars and so this should be taken into account when creating solutions or peace-keeping negotiations. For example, stereotypical counter-insurgency methods created during ‘old wars’ were used in the recent wars in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some consider this to be out-dated and should no longer be used in newer wars around the world. For this reason, Kaldor’s theory aids research into new concepts more in keeping with contemporary conflict as she emphasises the distinctive features of modern warfare. Most successfully, the New Wars thesis provides a complex analysis of human and social dynamics within conflict that have naturally changed due to economy, culture and the era it occurred. She also offers a good understanding of the interrelationship between development and security, “Development is understood as individual security, not in state-based, territorial terms of GDP, economic growth or macro-economic stabilisation but as an approach which emphasises ‘partnership, local ownership, (and) engagement with civil society and gender sensitivity’” (Chandler quoting Kaldor, 2008, p267). This is further explored by Mark Duffield as he states, “the discourse of human insecurity is one of permanent emergency and unending war…human security is a key reflection of the dominance of biopolitical framings of international relations—interconnecting security and development concerns—through having ‘life’ or the population as a reference point rather than the state.” (Chandler paraphrasing Duffield, 2008, p268). Failures by the state to uphold authority, the globalisation of populations and stratified markets into the economy have all lead to social transformations which are distinct from older wars. Kaldor strengthens and legitimizes her theory by using Bosnia-Herzegovina as a case study of a new war.

Kaldor cites Burundi, Chechnya, Rwanda, and so on as examples of new wars. However, she focuses predominantly on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an “archetypal example, (of) the paradigm of the new type of warfare.” (Kaldor, 1999, p31). She states that “Some 260,000 people died and around two-thirds of the population were displaced from their homes. Violations of human rights took place on a massive scale, including forced detention, torture, rape and castration.” (Kaldor, 1999, p31). Amongst this, the involvement of paramilitary groups and aggravated national identity politics alongside the use of genocide and the practice of ethnic cleansing, all led her to conclude that this war as an exemplar case of new war. This included intimidation tactics through nationalistic ideologies between religious groups, most of the populations being Muslim, “the Serbs were Orthodox and the Croats were Catholic.” (Kaldor, 1999, p33). The growth of criminality and the collapse of both authority and the economy also demonstrate this war as having many hallmark features of new war. “Croatians were…expelled or chose to leave from parts of Central Bosnia captured by Bosnian forces during the Muslim-Croat conflict, and this was also true of the Serbs…” (Kaldor, 1999, p43). She believes terrorism and guerrilla warfare are more common within more recent wars. These characteristics “that have emerged in the last few decades are not…limited to military strategies but have also affected the political rationality and international legitimacy of war and preparations for war.” (Münkler, 2005, p29-30). Yet, by labelling all new wars as limited or simplistic and thus politically invalid, it can seem somewhat belittling or condescending, especially to those affected by that conflict. Overall, it seems that the New Wars thesis encapsulates the Bosnia-Herzegovina war including other post-Cold War conflicts on the grounds of loose coalitions of participatory actors, violence to meet political ends, manipulation of the economy and identity politics as being the driving force within these types of conflicts. Nevertheless, these characteristics are often found within conflicts in developing ‘third world’ countries rather than it being just a result of contemporary warfare. It can also be said that all of her new war distinctions have actually been features of old wars too with slight differences due to globalisation, but with the dynamics usually the same. This is more difficult to prove because of how little information we have on warfare compared to now. Even so, she only focuses on old European wars whilst not accounting and analysing enough old wars throughout history to be fully convincing.

The New Wars thesis is empirically inaccurate as many of the distinctions that are made can also be seen in pre-Cold War conflicts, thus she does not offer anything that ‘new’ to her analysis. Differences noted between formal and non-formal combatants are not necessarily relative to pre or post-Cold War, but are thought to be linked to the Enlightenment period around the 17^th century. It is thought that military administration and formalities were “much more haphazard and tenuous” (Ostwald, 2012, paragraph 4) than seen in modern ‘first world’ countries. Kaldor’s analysis of military distinctions begins in the 18^th century, which many argue should not be considered ‘old’. She does not provide enough evidence of wars that are undeniably considered old or ancient such as conflicts that occurred a few millennia ago. Additionally, her concept of ‘mutual enterprises’ being the underlying foundation of new conflicts is not a new concept. War can often provide economic opportunities from strict rationing, mass employment, trade, humanitarian aid and so on which can be used towards a profitable wartime economy. Continuing warfare because of the advantages it brings to the economy is an aim both old and new wars have exhibited as peaceful resolutions are not always as beneficial as ongoing mutual conflict. Some argue that “war leads to the utilization of unused capacity and brings underutilized factors into the production process…increased participation in the labour force by women and minorities in heterogeneous societies during wartime.” (Stein, 1980, p412). The increase of labour within production has been a constant feature of old as well as new war. Specifically in old wars, “wartime mobilization once served to draw peripheral geographical areas into a national market…wartime increases in demand and resource coordination (which) can lead to a more efficient utilization of factors of production by increasing concentration and scale and thus increasing productivity as well.” (Stein and Russett paraphrasing Tilly, 1980, p412). Mobilization during wartime also increases technological innovation and so both new and old wars use ‘advanced methods’ (relative to its time) of gaining success. Globalisation may create economic opportunities in newer wars but it can be equally said that ideas of old “war also involves a redistribution of wealth and income, and this too promotes growth…the disruption of international trade leads to substitution for imported raw materials and to the development and protection of infant industries producing previously imported goods.” (Stein paraphrasing Wright, 1980, p412).  Furthermore, old wars have not always been fought by states in defence of their territory, despite Kaldor maintaining they were all centralized and more ‘principled’. She states that they were “rationalized” (Kaldor, 1999, p15) and incorrectly implies that they were more upright. This underlying bias undermines the overall accuracy and cogency of her argument. In addition, she frequently references old European wars but does not go into enough detail on old wars from other cultures unless she is discussing contemporary conflict. She fails to analyse differing cultural standards towards warfare and her thesis has been interpreted by some critics for containing subtle but damaging racial undertones.

Kaldor somewhat romanticises earlier wars by asserting that they were hierarchical, complexly strategic and abided by war laws such as the ‘Geneva Conventions’. She argues that “state interest became the dominant legitimation of war” (Kaldor, 1999, p17) and so violence by non-state actors is therefore unjust. To argue that old wars have only exhibited purely ‘legal’ methods of warfare would be a fallacy. Ambiguity within the laws created loopholes for anyone aiming to manipulate it, for example, “interpretation of the concept of occupation…is not universally shared. The German Military Manual for example states: ‘Occupied territory does not include battle areas’ (Dörmann, 2003, p62). Moreover, illegal criminal activity is not just seen in new wars. Identity politics and war crimes such as rape have notoriously been a reality that has affected civilians in many older wars as well. Genocide as a method of ethnic cleansing can be seen in World War 2 with the Holocaust or (for example) in 1915, when Armenians experienced “forced deportation marches and deaths due to disease in concentration camps… estimated to have killed more than 1 million ethnic Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks between 1915 and 1923.” (United to End Genocide, 2016, part 1). War has always been barbaric and the civilian population are often targeted in order to further certain political aims. Yet, Kaldor maintains the idea that “‘new wars’ base politics on  identity  rather than ideology,  and  they  mobilize  popular  support  through  group  resemblance  rather  than party  adherence.”  (Nickels, 2009, p3).  It is more plausible however, to argue that “Patterns of victimization are more correctly seen as a reflection of contextual and not temporal variables…circumstances obtaining in a particular situation. In terms of the human security impact of conflict, especially civil war, the deliberate targeting of civilians, rape, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities are not peculiar to wars of the latter part of the 20th century.” (Newman, 2004, p181). An example of an earlier Western intra-state war that witnessed many atrocities is the ‘Nine Years War’ (1594-1603), to which “Victory was only achieved by waging a brutal war during which terrorizing and massacring the Gaelic Irish and numerous other atrocities were commonplace. Crops and food supplies were routinely burned, causing widespread hunger and even the depopulation of some areas at the end of the war.” (O’Neill, 2013, paragraph 3). Some interpret her thesis as jingoistic and arrogant, implying that Kaldor considers ‘new wars’, or more specifically wars in developing countries, to be savage and illegitimate compared to old wars. Her theoretical inconsistencies point to a larger problem with her thesis; the emergence of the concept of ‘Good War’ (a moral interpretation of certain warfare being just) and the aggrandizement of old Eurocentric warfare.

Kaldor argues that new wars are constantly on-going and seem endless, even though the ‘Argentine Civil Wars’ (for example) first started in 1814 and ended in 1880. State failure as well as other factors such as new wars being mostly ‘rampages or controlled by gangs’, led Kaldor to claim that the “political legitimacy (of new war) is disappearing” (Kaldor, 1999, p5). However, a concept like state failure is not peculiar to recent wars. As Helen Dexter explains, “the narrative of the ‘new war’ and the return of the ‘Good War’…has not only been used to describe, explain and excuse western intervention but that, through de-politicizing, de-contextualizing and criminalizing non-western warfare, the new war theory has helped to create the conditions that support the ‘war on terror.’” (Dexter, 2007, part 1). Kaldor ‘others’ conflicts from developing countries and trivializes their problems as being almost trifling. “Identity politics has always been central to war. Because nationalism as a defining political idea raises the claims of a particular community against others…All nationalisms, even the most progressive, must involve the subordination to a greater or lesser extent of other nationalities, or national groups.” (Dexter, 2007, paragraph 2). Her depiction of actors in the developing world is one of primitivism, such as when she states that new wars have a “retrograde set of social relationships, which is entrenched by law, (and) has a tendency to spread across the borders through refugees or organized crime or ethnic minorities.” (Kaldor, 1999, p9). However, some new wars like the war in Syria, is very serious and should not be depoliticised or deemed illegitimate. The Syrian war is a revolutionary political conflict (just like her description of old wars) because of the aim to overthrow President Assad, but because they have failed to democratically manage conflict it has resulted in sectarian violence, which she considers to be a new war characteristic. She seems to unconvincingly dismiss examples that counter-act her claims as well as erroneously ignore the significant role media has in her new war analysis. The New Wars Thesis can be interpreted as morally justifying old European wars and condescendingly invalidating newer wars from disadvantaged parts of the world. This is a “worrying aspects of the Good War revival…because the roles of the criminal and law enforcer appear at this stage to be geographically fixed. The narrative of policing crimes to explain the use of violence does not have the same legitimacy when used by the non-western world.” (Dexter, 2007, last part). Overall, “many so-called ‘new’ civil wars…reflect types of conflict that are not particularly ‘modern’, and in fact reflect rather enduring patterns over the last century” (Newman, 2004, p185), thus rendering Kaldor’s thesis imprecise and unpersuasive.

Kaldor’s theoretical iterations are mostly inconsistent and are overall not an effective guide for policy-making and research. Many of her new war distinctions can be said to have also occurred in ‘old wars’, and she does not tackle this problem enough in her limited analysis of old war. Nonetheless, she adequately details globalization and state failure as features of conflict which can be used to further research into warfare, both old and new. This, aided by Duffield’s insight into social transformation, is a valid and significant distinction for contemporary conflict. Characteristically, war generally follows a similar pattern of conflict with some slight differences due to context such as economic standing, political goals, standards and issues relating to culture and less so, time period.

xx

Bibliography

Chandler, D. (2008), Review Article- Conflict, Security & Development 8:2 pp 265 — 276, published by Routledge, page 267, 268.

Dexter, H. (2007), New War, Good War and the War on Terror: Explaining, Excusing and Creating Western Neo-interventionism, published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., part 1, chapter 5 paragraph 2, last part.

Dörmann, K. (2003), The legal situation of “unlawful/unprivileged combatants Vol. 85 No. 849, published by the International Committee of the Red Cross, page 62.

Kaldor, M. (1999), New and Old Wars- Organized Violence in a Global Era, published by Stanford University Press, pages 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 5, 31, 33, 43, 15, 17.

Münkler, H. (2005), The New Wars, published by Cambridge Polity Press, chapter 1 pages 9-10, 29-30.

Newman, E. (2004), The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed-Security Dialogue Vol. 35 No. 2, published by Sage Publications, pages 181, 185.

Nickels, B. P. (2009), Journal of Military and Strategic Studies Vol. 12 Issue. 1, published by the Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, page 3.

O’Neill, E. (2013), English Atrocities in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Ireland, posted onto academia (full date unknown), available at http://www.academia.edu/4622372/English_Atrocities_in_Sixteenth_and_Seventeenth_Century_Ireland, paragraph 3.  

Ostwald, J. (2012), A Military Enlightenment? – Historiography Research, posted onto WordPress (August 1^st), available at https://jostwald.wordpress.com/2012/08/01/a-military-enlightenment/, paragraph 4.

Stein, A. A. and Russett, B. M. Edited by Gurr, T. R (1980), Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research pp. 399–422-Evaluating War: Outcomes and Consequences, published by New York: The Free Press, page 412.

United to End Genocide (2016), Past Genocides and Mass Atrocities, posted onto endgenocide (full date unknown), available at http://endgenocide.org/learn/past-genocides/, Armenia-part 1.