The proposal of racial integration- an analysis with reference to Elizabeth Anderson

[This blog post is an edited essay of mine from my final year at University of Birmingham©]

Racial integration is a necessary and possibly vital solution to the problem of unofficial racial segregation, which hinders substantive democracy as it permeates various aspects of daily life like housing, employment, education and so on. Elizabeth Anderson offers a ‘non-ideal’ theory (a corrective and realistic pragmatic approach with partial compliance before any idealisation occurs) to remedy unjust race relations. She specifically refers to the relationship between blacks and whites in America and so that will be the main focus of this essay. Her argument provides a logical and convincing resolution to widespread racial inequality.

Anderson begins by explaining that “Segregation has…structures and norms of spatial and social separation, to prevent contact from members of different groups, and hierarchal role segregation, to ensure that where contact occurs, it is on terms of domination and subordination.” (Anderson, 2010, p112). The unjust deprivation that blacks receive in relation to “access to jobs, public goods, consumer goods and services, and financial, social, cultural and human capital.” (Anderson, 2010, p112) displays how there is an underlying stigmatization of racial prejudices, stereotypes and discrimination. She utilizes Charles Tilly’s conception that unequal group relations are caused by exclusive dominant sections of society who undemocratically hoard opportunity and monopolize the control of goods, both justifying and exploiting their power. Her revisionist approach to this issue involves the key principle of integration which has four stages; formal desegregation, spatial integration, formal social integration and informal social integration. First, she states that “Formal desegregation consists in the abolition of laws and policies enforcing racial separation.” (Anderson, 2010, p116). Segregation is what damages democracy and causes racial inequality, thus integration is the only just solution to this. “Spatial integration consists in the common use on terms of equality of facilities and public spaces by substantial numbers of all races” in order to eliminate the “shunning of marginalized groups by avoiding neighborly, collegial, or friendly relationships with them.” (Anderson, 2010, p116). When ‘ethnic minorities’ in power have as much authority and equality as their Caucasian counterparts, or when minorities and whites can cooperate on equal terms, then formal social integration has been achieved. It “occurs when members of different races cooperate in accordance with institutionally defined roles, and all races occupy all roles in enough numbers that roles are not racially identified.” (Anderson, 2010, p116). Lastly, “Informal social integration involves cooperation, ease, welcome, trust, affiliation, and intimacy that go beyond the requirements of organizationally defined roles.” (Anderson, 2010, p116). This occurs when people of differing racial backgrounds fully mix and can form close relationships or bonds. Thus, it is imperative that both dominant and subordinate groups in society are involved in the effort to achieve full integration. In whole, “Integration can be thought of as a simple, quantitative demographic goal, as the result of secure political belonging and full inclusion as a citizen with the access to social goods and rights that attend that status, or it can focus on the relations between persons and their interactions across social activities.” (Sundstrom, 2013, p2).

Anderson’s proposal is a persuasive and sophisticated approach to racial issues caused by racial segregation. She uses numerous empirical examples of racial intolerance as evidence to demonstrate the importance of integration, such as “…white flight, low rates of intermarriage with blacks, the reluctance of nonwhites to adopt black children, and the exclusion of blacks from informal networks of association and mentorship that are so critical to educational and career advancement.” (Anderson, 2004, p16). Integration is imperative in order to increase opportunities. Segregated societies do exist, however there has been some efforts to achieve social and spatial integration; “spatial integration has been mostly achieved for public accommodations such as hotels, restaurants, and buses…social integration has advanced most effectively in the workplace…government offices, and higher education. ” (Anderson, 2010, p116-117). This helps to improve their education, job prospects, physical and mental health and thus create a greater standard of living that can be accomplished by minorities. Integration also leads to cooperation and destigmatization. Informal social integration such as interracial relationships allow for a better understanding of different cultures and help create formal cooperative group dynamics between races. This means “ending laws and policies that turned blacks into an untouchable caste by forcing them into separate and inferior public spaces…an essential step toward destigmatization. While stigma still exists, blacks’ public standing is better now that they can no longer be forced to the back of the bus.” (Anderson, 2011, p17). Reducing harmful favouritism within groups and hostility between different groups will increase the chance of people having integrated relationships. Full integration would ensure democratic values of justice and equality are upheld, “This requires that people from all walks of life have effective access to channels of communication to elites, and that they be able to hold them accountable for their decisions.” (Anderson, 2011, p17). Juries and eyewitness testimonies would not be unfairly biased along racial lines and police brutality would decrease due to better community relations between whites and minorities. These reasons demonstrate how integration is necessary in order to overturn lingering segregated societies and ensure an efficient democracy for all.

Though some criticize her perspective claiming that “Anderson seems distracted by American spectacles of social identities, which leaves her analysis unreceptive to how those festivals engender community building and mobilization. This problem might be related to her use of…Tilly’s…assertion that the structures that lead to disparity are unintentional, and that opportunity hoarding and the emulation of such practices across social networks, rather than belief structures, are what causes inequality to be persistent. (This) methodology fails to consider the prominent role of racial ideology in inequality.” (Sundstrom, 2013, p3). Her proposal can be considered too idealistic in its expectation for all races to want to integrate. Her ideology is not shared amongst all people and to expect change from those who already experience injustice can be considered patronizing and misinformed to some. Despite integration being difficult to achieve due to historical prejudices, many believe integration is not occurring because of some minorities deliberately distancing themselves from whites, establishing their own cultural ‘bubble’. This is to say some may fear integration, equating it to a dilution of their ethnic identity and traditions, especially in their second and third generation offspring’s. Many, such as Tommie Shelby contend that integration is a requirement of justice, arguing for a left-wing pluralist alternative. Blacks may self-segregate themselves residentially so to circumvent any discrimination and hostility as well as form close communities and create solidarity; “When such choices are motivated by racial bias and prejudice, they are clearly wrong and contrary to our duty of justice. But many of these reasons are perfectly legitimate and thus should not be dismissed in efforts to respond to black-white inequality.” (Shelby, 2014, p272). Shelby believes it is wrong and unreasonable to expect blacks to undertake the risk of integration efforts as they have too long been stigmatized by others, therefore it is not their duty of justice. Blacks can still choose to integrate but many prefer to focus their attention only on the needs of their family and community rather than act on a ‘broader’, macrocosmic level in the pursuit for integration. Yet, “given the universal duty to promote just social arrangements, blacks’ choices that are incompatible with integration must be, on Anderson’s account, contrary to their duty of justice.” (Shelby, 2014, p267), which seems illogical and condescending. He offers ‘egalitarian pluralism’, claiming this does not demand integration, but desegregation, fair distribution and opportunities. The aim should be to “make their neighborhoods less disadvantaged, but without aiming to rearrange neighborhood demographics by race… (Blacks) are generally skeptical that a sufficient number of whites are currently willing to relinquish their unjust social, material, and political advantages in order to secure racial equality.” (Shelby, 2014, p274). Thus, a more realistic perspective is needed that would allow blacks to organize their own groups in order to protect their interests, whilst also aiming for racial justice. This would provide minorities with a thriving cultural and social capital.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that the “avoidance of integration is found across the whole American political spectrum. The Imperative of Integration argues that all of these purported remedies for racial injustice rest on the illusion that racial justice can be achieved without racial integration.”(Anderson, 2004, p1). Shelby’s pessimistic view that “The fundamental problem might simply be that blacks are often at the mercy of whites’ arbitrary cultural tastes and must conform to white expectations (or at least appear to) if they are to succeed.” (Shelby, 2014, p279) is too accepting of white dominance. Shelby states that “just because you live in the same neighborhood (as whites) does not mean that your neighbors will invite you into their homes, vouch for you when it counts, share information with you that would advance your socioeconomic prospects, or even be friendly toward you.” (Shelby, 2014, p275). This is true to some extent, however living in the same areas as whites can make it far more likely that minorities will be included more in socioeconomic prospects than if they never lived alongside whites. Tolerance and acceptance is only cultivated through understanding. This can only occur when people experience different cultures through interaction and integration. Diverse cultural identities are an important feature of modern society. Yet it is the inclusion of other races to share, accept and engage in other culture’s interests that is vital to creating tolerance and integration. For example, the ‘Notting Hill Carnival’ in the UK brings Caribbean culture to an otherwise homogeneously white country, whilst the ‘ZEE London Mela’ brings Indian culture to the UK. Anderson maintains that informal social integration is vital to rectifying racial unrest, even if cultural capital is gained in other ways. Eroding blacks’ identity, harmony or community is not necessary, only integration is. “The ideal of integration envisions a restructuring of intergroup relations, from alienation, anxiety, awkwardness, and hostility to relaxed, competent civil association and even intimacy; from domination and subordination to cooperation as equals.” (Anderson, 2010, p117). This can only be achieved if everyone participates, not just a single group. Integration is valuable but perhaps more emphasis should be placed on ‘local solidarity’ which “builds community, makes a path for trans-institutional solidarity, and provides a basis for larger social and political inclusion.” (Sundstrom, 2013, p4). This “also serves as a break against the appropriation of liberal ideals for illiberal ends, for example, the use of the ideal of integration in redevelopment and de-concentration programs that result in land grabs, displacement, the breaking up of communities and the further immiseration of poor people rather than any real integration.” (Sundstrom paraphrasing HoSang, 2013, p4). Group identity and community can be the foundation for equity and inclusion and so integration need not deny commonality and unity within racial groups. Thus, “Anderson’s account of integration is consistent with the community-affirmed values of inclusion, equity, and participation in so far as it is motivated by the ideals of democracy and equality in social relations.” (Sundstrom paraphrasing Anderson, 2013, p3).

The proposal of integration is a complex, practical and realistic enough solution to racial injustice, however local solidarity is the integral component of successful integration. Integration ought to involve all persons, no matter what their race. Nevertheless, it is still the decision of ethnic minorities to undertake this ‘burden’ as it is their right to concentrate solely on the needs of their own people. Yet, then they must also accept a certain amount of exclusion that may come with this. Furthering one’s own people (in the case of minorities) can effectively coincide with achieving racial equality for all and Anderson has adequately demonstrated this.

 xx

Bibliography

Anderson, E. (2004), Racial Integration as a Compelling Interest (Vol. 21:13), published by University of Minnesota Law School, pages 16, 1.

Anderson, E. (2010), The Imperative of Integration, published by Princeton University Press, Chapter 6 pages 112, 116, 117.

Anderson, E. (2011), Why Racial Integration Remains an Imperative, in Poverty & Race (Vol.20 No.4), published by the Poverty & Race Research Action Council, page 17.

Shelby, T (2014), Integration, Inequality, and Imperatives of Justice: A

Review Essay, in Philosophy and Public Affairs (Vol.42 No.3 pp. 254-285), published by Wiley Periodicals Inc., pages 272, 267, 274, 275.

Sundstrom, R. (2013), Comment on Elizabeth Anderson’s The Imperative of Integration-Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy, in Philosophy (Vol.9 No.2), published by The University of San Francisco, pages 2, 3, 4.

Can men, as a group, be oppressed?- with reference to Marilyn Frye's analysis

[This blog post is an edited essay of mine from my final year at University of Birmingham©]

‘Oppression’ is a word commonly used to describe the unfair treatment of a certain group by some kind of authoritative voice. I believe it should be viewed as more subjective in emphasising an individual’s attitudes and experiences that have a generally similar undertone of methodical maltreatment. I will argue in favour of Caroline New’s theory of oppression that includes both sexes and that there is a ‘systematic mistreatment of men’ within society. I argue that Marilyn Frye’s definition is not wrong, but inadequate as oppression does not necessarily always need a specific ‘oppressor group’ and men can still feel the effects of gender-based oppression (but on a less severe level) without taking away its meaning. Furthermore, I want to compare Frye’s argument to the unreasonable notion that ‘white people cannot receive racism’ to highlight how flawed her reasoning is.

Frye defined oppression as “Something pressed…caught between or among forces and barriers which are so related to each other that jointly they restrain, restrict or prevent the thing’s motion or mobility.” (Frye, 1983, p2). She explains that the commonality amongst the oppressed is the ‘double bind’ which is when “situations are reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to penalty, censure or deprivation”. (Frye, 1983, p2). To Frye, oppression is systematic and on a large scale, where only the docility of the oppressed ensures their livelihood and reputation remain untarnished, yet their value of life becomes diminished by such subjugation. She states, “The experience of oppressed people is that the living of one’s life is confined and shaped by forces and barriers which are not accidental or occasional and hence avoidable, but are systematically related to each other in such a way as to catch one between and among and restrict or penalize motion in any direction.” (Frye, 1983, p4). Thus, oppression must be experienced by a large group or section of society and not as isolated incidents. For Frye, oppression has to come from an organized network of obstructions which cannot be evaded but become part of life for a group. This coined with the fact that men first created gender-based divisions within law and culture, was why she concluded that men cannot be oppressed due to their gender. Men usually benefit from gender inequality so, any grievances about how their gender negatively affects them is not considered oppression by Frye as “that barrier (was) erected and maintained by men, for the benefit of men.” (Frye, 1983, p13). Frye does not dispute that men can be oppressed by their race, class, disability and so on, but maintains “men are not oppressed as men.” (Frye, 1983, p16). Thus, oppression is when barriers that have been structurally put in place, limit a social group because of another social group’s desire to exploit them in order to benefit in some way from their suffrage. She “succeeds in placing women tidily within her parameters, (but) loose ends within the substance of her theory present significant flaws in terms of its applicability to other social groups.” (Gillingham, 2012, paragraph 1).

Many agree with Frye’s definition, especially in relation to the oppression of women. Realists or objectivists would agree that oppression needs to be clearly defined so as to not render it meaningless by constant ‘incorrect’ use, “When the effects of sexism, for example, are not understood macroscopically as the products of systemic injustices, they are understood microscopically as the exclusive problems of particular women who have made bad choices, have poor attitudes, are too sensitive, or who are overreacting to a random incident.” (Bailey. 1998, p105). When oppression is used incorrectly it can make correctly using it sound like a ‘non-issue’; when society does not understand the collective and at times subtle wrongdoings they commit under the definition of oppression. To some, an incorrect way of using oppression is when ‘able-bodied, middle class, white, cisgender, heterosexual men’ use this term, avoiding a key element to their status in society: privilege. Some claim that in order to understand Frye’s perspective on the ‘non-existence’ of ‘male oppression’ by gender alone, one must recognize “the role privilege plays in maintaining systems of domination.” (Bailey, 1998, p104). Men have been considered ‘the dominant’ for so long that historically they have been able to use this power to enforce and maintain oppressive social divisions within law and culture. To this day, many sects of society still feel the remnants of these divisions and rightly constitute this as oppression. Men experience a certain privilege that can lead some to believe that (for example) “The gender roles which make public tearfulness inappropriate for men are unfair and may indeed be harmful to men's emotional well-being, but there is no network of forces or barriers which says both crying and not crying are unacceptable…” (Bailey, 1998, p105). Male privilege is why many argue that men “can be miserable without being oppressed, and it is perfectly consistent to deny that a person or group is oppressed without denying that they have feelings or that they suffer.” (Frye, 1983, p2). It is convincing to state that not all suffering is oppression because it is true that “No human is free of social structures…Structure consists of boundaries, limits and barriers; in a structured whole, some motions and changes are possible, and others are not.” (Frye, 1983, p10). However, this could mean that all are oppressed as we live under a ‘social structure’, which is true to some extent by acknowledging that oppression has many levels. Yet, it can be argued that one is not oppressed until one feels that they have experienced ‘systematic mistreatment’ on some level because of a particular inescapable aspect of their life.

Oppression can be experienced on many different levels. As an example, some ethnic minorities may never experience racial discrimination or not on the same level as others, perhaps because of their social class or another factor. Just as many men may feel they are not oppressed, some men feel that they are. This is not to say it is on the same level of oppression as women. Everyone should be educated on the types and levels of oppression felt by different social groups, including the more elusive forms of oppression onto groups who are less understood to be affected by it. A man’s feelings of oppression in terms of sexism does not take away from a woman’s feelings of sexism, as it should be generally understood that they do not experience the same type or level of oppression. Frye’s argument can be equated to the claim that ‘white people cannot experience racial discrimination’. We can see this is untrue of places such as post-apartheid South Africa, where white people have become so discriminated against that many are dubbed unemployable and live in squatter camps. To argue that because a group (be it whites or men) have historically held the most economic and political power that this must naturally mean that they cannot receive mistreatment in the same form today is “far too structuralist and (has) failed to realise and recognise as a result that racism… (and sexism are) manifested in different ways and exists at different levels.” (Harvey, 2016, paragraph4). It seems unfair and counter-intuitive to cast certain groups aside because of inequalities experienced in the past. The definition of oppression needs to incorporate the world’s diverse and fast evolving societies, some of which have such subtle forms of gender-based oppression of men that they are not widely recognised or taken seriously. 

New’s definition of ‘systematic mistreatment’ is expressed as “A group X is oppressed if, in certain respects, its members are systematically mistreated in comparison to non-Xs in a given social context, and if this mistreatment is justified or excused in terms of some alleged or real characteristic of the group.” (New, 2001, p731). It focuses “on the institutionalised nature of oppressive social relations, so that oppression can sometimes exist without a clear or enduring oppressor group.” (New, 2001, p730). This allows for more social groups to be considered than Frye’s narrow, self-serving definition. Men may at times benefit off the oppression of women but that is not to say that all do or that some cannot feel oppression in a similar way. The very notion of denying men the use of the word oppression seems oppressive in and of itself. Undermining men’s feelings of oppression is harmful and marginalizes their experiences, just as some do to women. Similarly, men and women alike can reinforce and encourage negative and oppressive behaviour onto males because of long-standing concepts of ‘what it means to be a man’. Oppression does not require a particular dominant social group to be a necessary condition of its definition. Thus, men can be oppressed as New states, “It is in men’s conservative interests to maintain a gender order that meets some of their human needs–although sometimes in very costly ways. But it is in their emancipatory interests to create an order that meets their own needs better…” (New, 2001, p744-745). Men are not yet emancipated from institutionalised and cultural limitations surrounding their gender.

Historically and presently there are many examples where men may feel oppressed because of their gender; male-only war conscription, unpunished and unrecognized male sexual assault and harassment, praise for stoicism over emotionality, gender bias over parenting rights, mistreatment felt by men in traditionally considered ‘female professions’, stigma on house-husbands and so on. Even in terms of sex, women are not often scorned for same-sex ‘experimentation’ or for openly speaking about kinks in the bedroom. Men do not have the same sexual openness in media and otherwise. “Homosexual men suffer more discrimination than do lesbians…male homosexual sex has been and continues to be criminalized or otherwise negatively targeted in more jurisdictions than is lesbian sex...(they) have a harder time adopting children than do lesbians (and) are much more frequently the victims of "gaybashing" assaults than are lesbians.” (Benatar paraphrasing Smith, O’Donnell and West, 2012, p183). It cannot be said that this is only due to negative societal concepts over homosexuality as women often do not face the same discrimination a man would for his sexuality. Women are in some ways much more sexually liberated than men, perhaps because women have fought for this freedom. Whereas men are “offered a limited version of heterosexuality as the only permitted form of sexual expression and intimacy” (New paraphrasing Snodgrass, 2001, p739). Suicide and alcoholism amongst men is considered an epidemic in Britain alone. Male depression is not adequately dealt with perhaps because of society’s pressure for men to ‘man up and move on’ rather than express their suffering. Frye would just call this ‘human misery’ however “even if it were true that these were costs of genuine privilege, it would not follow that these costs were inevitable results. Those with power can divert resources in order to combat such side-effects of their power, thereby further improving their position.” (Benatar, 2012, p205). These are just some examples of men being oppressed due to gender. Therefore, it would be foolish and condescending not to account some problems faced by mostly men or men alone to oppression.

Frye’s definition adequately expresses female oppression but is not inclusive of oppression felt by different social groups. New’s definition is more applicable to all situations and so is more substantial and agreeable. Men are not exempt from being oppressed and to argue otherwise defeats the equality we want encouraged within society. Although some men may at times benefit from patriarchy and sexism against women, this is not evidence that men cannot feel oppression in a similar way. Men are oppressed by men, women and structural institutions surrounding gender norms and expectations. Both genders (in varying ways and on different levels) are not having their emancipatory interests met and are held back by certain limitations placed on their gender, in their own rights.

xx

Bibliography

Bailey, A. (1998) Privilege: Expanding on Marilyn Frye's ‘Oppression’ Vol. 29 No. 3 pp. 104-119, published by the Journal of Social Philosophy, pages 105, 104.

Benatar, D. (2012) The Second Sexism: Discrimination Against Men and Boys Vol. 29 No. 2, in Blackwell Public Philosophy, published by the Wiley-Blackwell Oxford, pages 183, 205.

Frye, M. (1983) The Politics of Reality: essays in feminist theory- Oppression, published by New York Crossing Press, pages 2, 4, 13, 16, 10.

Gillingham, E. (2012), Frye's 'Oppression': An Inadequate Definition, in 1.3 Women and Gender in Writing, posted onto Em-Journal (March), available at http://em-journal.com/2012/03/fryes-oppression-an-inadequate-definition-1.html, paragraph 1.

Harvey, E. (2016) The rise of a new black racism in South Africa, posted onto Mail & Guardian (16th May), available at http://mg.co.za/article/2016-05-16-00-the-rise-of-a-new-black-racism-in-south-africa, paragraph 4.

New, C. (2001) Oppressed and oppressors? The systematic mistreatment of men- Sociology Vol. 35 No. 3 pp. 729–748, published by BSA Publications Limited, pages 731, 730, 744-745.

  

Is acting from duty ‘ethically lacking’?- issues in contemporary moral theory

[This blog post is an edited essay of mine from my final year at University of Birmingham©]

‘Acting from duty’ is a deontological approach to morality in which one acts because of their obligations to set moral rules which guide their ethical thinking. Immanuel Kant provided an example of a deontic moral theory in which he offered a principle called the ‘Categorical Imperative’ as the standard of rationality for all moral judgements. This will be the foundation for my determination that acting out of duty is ‘ethically lacking’. I propose that Kant’s moral philosophy is a limited ethical theory that ought to be challenged due to various factors that weaken the overall adequacy of its use.

Categorical imperatives are chiefly about morality and “tell us what to do regardless of our desires.” (Hooker, 2002, p1). These are set moral rules that cannot be evaded which Kant claims is the supreme principle in which all morals demands originate. This derives from reason and is essential that all rational agents conform to it. It is expressed through the formulae of ‘Universal Law’ and of ‘Humanity’. He puts the first formula as “‘Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.’” (Hooker quoting Kant, 2002, p1). The axiom behind an action must first be conceptually willed to be obeyed by the universe, once it passes this test it is the right law to follow. The second formula is, “‘act that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.’” (Kerstein quoting Kant, 2009, p163). Kant believed humanity should be treated respectfully and that people should not be used to meet our own needs. Increasing happiness is the aim but not if that means mistreating others to attain that happiness. Many problems have been highlighted when he asserts the ‘Motive of Duty’ that follows these formulae and can make his theory seem somewhat ethically lacking. This concept states that we should only be motivated to act out of obligation and not out of any impulse. Dutiful actions are not from “motives of self-interest, self-preservation, sympathy and happiness… (and do) not express a good will” (Johnson and Cureton, 2016, paragraph 5). This appears problematic as morality is often considered subjective at times and emotional impulses help many to act in a way that they view as correct and in accordance with their ‘moral compass’ or will. Yet, Kant maintains that there are unavoidable ‘absolute laws’ that must be obeyed. For many, his absolutist approach is considered far too rigid for morality and is not even fully accepted by all Kantians, demonstrated by the many distinctions made within Kantian ethical theories.

An example of an act Kant believed to be forbidden is lying. The ‘enquiring murderer’ dilemma was thought up to challenge the notion of duties to objective laws such as not lying. If a murderer asks directions to your friend in order to kill them, then by Kant’s account you ought to tell the truth. In doing so, your action contributes an indirect role in their death which seems counter-intuitive and unethical. One response is that “a universal practice of lying to murderers inquiring about their intended victims might allow such lies to work, and thus establish a limited right to lie.” (McCarty, 2012, p331). However, arguments that try to circumvent this problem can seem forced and unconvincing, as now we have multiple duties (with exceptions being made for certain lies and situations) which seems impractical and contradictory to enforce as a ‘universal’ maxim. The element of objectivity within his theory has been manipulated to appear almost subjective in order to make his theory work. Moral exceptions ought to be made, but should not be masqueraded as absolute when laws are warped to be more inclusive of abnormal situations. Moral norms and rules are subject to change due to time, culture and various other factors and so it is unfeasible to will certain laws to work for everyone. Having benevolent emotional impulses such as love or kindness behind one’s actions are not what Kant considered as pertinent as just following one’s duty. Kant claims that acting out of duty is to be virtuous and of good character, however many consider this unnatural and unsuccessful, conceptually and in practice. “Kant’s requirements for moral motives may be too strong, such that even the duty motive itself may be perhaps ruled out by those conditions…duty has no more claim to be such a motive than do various emotions.” (Oakley, 1990, p442). It can be said that people who act only out of duty do not have any personal connection with morality and are alienated from their loved ones. Michael Stocker contends that Kant has left out motives in the study of morality, generating a kind of schizophrenia within Kantians as they are unable to use their motives as reasons enough to base their actions on. “Suppose that someone goes to the hospital to visit a friend and, when asked by his friend why he is visiting him, he answers that he is visiting his friend out of duty.” (Borges referencing Stocker, 2013, part 5). Not feeling any inclination to visit your friend seems impersonal, cold and somewhat inhuman. To many, it is more meaningful and righteous to ‘want’ to do something as opposed to ‘having’ to do something. Instinctively, the moral worth of visiting out of love and compassion is greater than out of obligation, but Kant insists the opposite. Moral emotions like sympathy and remorse should not be discounted as credible motives as these emotions are often appreciated and respected, as well as sometimes being the only reason for some to act ethically. Duty alone is not enough for some to carry out moral acts and so other reasons behind motives need to be taken into account. Thus, “the Kantian criticism of emotions as impulsive and capricious is an unjustified generalization.” (Oakley, 1990, p443).

Marcia Baron contended Stocker’s points and argued Kant’s motive of duty principle is ethical. She explains that “the person who acts from duty, in the sense in which acting from duty is being advocated, is moved both by considerations that x is morally required and by considerations that x is morally recommended…she is committed to being moved by both.” (Baron, 1984, p201). This combats the thought that acting from duty is only ‘minimally moral’ as she believes too many mistakenly consider it to be “unreflective, cowardly, or both.” (Baron, 1980, p200). Baron’s position is that Kant has not excluded feelings behind some motivations, in fact he acknowledged the moral worth of benevolence and altruism behind actions and recognised negative feelings as wrong. “Since we have a direct duty of beneficence, we also have an indirect duty to cultivate our natural capacities for participating emotionally in the joys and sorrows of others.” (Mathias paraphrasing Kant, 1999, p261) She clarifies that ‘duty’ is misunderstood as ‘forceful’ and that Stocker’s example can be countered by arguing that the hospital visitor’s motivations should be supported by duty and if they ever ceased to feel any impulse to visit their friend then they ought to still visit out of duty. This is what makes their actions contain moral worth. Thus, Kant’s theory reasons that “acting from duty plus inclination meshes better with friendship than does acting from duty without inclination, or in the face of a strong opposing inclination.” (Baron, 1984, p203). However, Kant still requires goodwill to be motivated by duty. Baron does not counteract Stocker’s point that acting solely out of obligation is ethically lacking. By arguing that emotional inclinations are not morally wrong unless they are coupled with certain maxims leaves the problem of those who have malevolent impulses yet obey good maxims. This is a dangerous concept if a moral principle were ever to change due to some environmental factor (perhaps a law or cultural tradition) then a person with malicious impulses may feel more inclined to act on them, such as pedophiles who have never acted upon their desires. Duty alongside virtuous impulses are seemingly preferable to both Kant and Baron but are not necessary or significant. Yet, it is reasonable to argue that if one has tried but failed to rouse warm feelings within oneself, one’s conduct can still be considered moral although from others’ perception, peculiar and unfavourable.

Emotions are not compelled by will and so it is difficult for them to be morally blameworthy. Nonetheless, we should always endeavour to transform any negative impulses we may have to positive ones that can better aid us in moral actions that effectively create happiness. Overall, acting from duty alone is considerably less morally worthy (but not immoral), as an objectivist approach to morality cannot encapsulate all ethical situations and thus ensure the most moral action is pursued. Therefore, it is preferable one should use philanthropic proclivities in any case when carrying out a moral act, whereas acting from duty alone is ethically lacking if not supported by these feelings.

 xx

Bibliography

Baron, M. (1984), The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting from Duty, in The Journal of Philosophy (Vol.81 No. 4 pp197-220), published by Journal of Philosophy Inc, pages 201, 200, 203.

Borges, M. de L. (2013), Kant on emotions and William’s criticism, in Veritas (Vol.58 No.1 pp131-150), licensed under Creative Commons, accessed by pdf at revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/ojs/index.php/veritas/article/download/12913/9030, part 5.

Hooker, B. (2002), Kant’s Normative Ethics, in Is Your Mind Your Brain? Thomas, A. (Issue 1), published by Richmond Journal of Philosophy, page 1.

Johnson, R. and Cureton, A. (2016), Kant's Moral Philosophy, published by Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, part 2 paragraph 5.

Kerstein, S. (2009), Treating Others Merely as Means, in Utilitas (Vol.21 No.2), published by Cambridge University Press, page 163.

Mathias, M. B. (1999), The Role of Sympathy in Kant’s Philosophy of Moral Education, published by Philosophy of Education, page 261.

McCarty, R. (2012), The Right to Lie: Kantian Ethics and The Inquiring Murderer, in American Philosophical Quarterly (Vol.49 No.4 pp331-343), published by University of Illinois Press, page 331.

Oakley, J. (1990), A Critique of Kantian Arguments against Emotions as Moral Motives, in History of Philosophy Quarterly (Vol.7 No.4 pp 441-459), published by University of Illinois Press, pages 442, 443.