Writing your Personal Statement- Tips and example

UCAS applications can be daunting and sometimes we need a little help getting across who we are to potential universities. I remember resenting the thought of needing to 'sell myself' like a product to strangers who had never even met me. But unfortunately this is the kind of skill we all must learn and finely tune in order to basically persuade employers to hire you. I was rubbish at this but with time and more experience, your skill for this kind of writing will improve. Its all about putting a persuasive and engaging slant on everything you have done in a bid to look like the best version of yourself. Its a bit like telling someone exactly how you want to be seen (in a professional/academic way) with a subtle side of bullshit. I got into my uni with an unconditional offer from high predicted grades (that didn't work out...) and my statement. So here are some tips which are colour coordinated to highlight sections of my statement the tip relates to...

• Its called a personal statement- so don't be afraid to get personal! If you can find a way of saying something kind of deep (but not pitiable or off topic) that shows who you genuinely are as a person, you will stand out and be more memorable to the reader. This can be as deep as you want it to be. Personally, (lol pardon the pun) I don't like to get too soppy or deep as it can kind of do opposite of what you're trying to achieve by possibly putting people off or 'trying too hard'.
• Even if you don't know what career you want to do (which was/is me), focus everything you are writing about to how it relates to your chosen course subject(s). Explain why your interested in it and give examples. These examples can be things you've read/learnt, an inspirational public figure/teacher, things happening in the news, experiences inside/outside school, family/peer challenges and even pop culture. Really try and question why you want to study something for 3 plus years and dig deep about what caused this interest.
• Conclude with a short paragraph talking about who you are behind just academia/work experiences. This can be in reference to extra-curricular activities or just things about your character. Yeah, you're trying to sell them how successful a student you are but part of that success is about your personality and how you may fit into their student body spirit and uni ethos. This gives you a chance to talk about yourself a bit more informally and give a lasting impression into who you really are other than just what you can give them; ending your statement on a sincere and genuine feeling that your well-rounded. 
• Make memorable statements. You're appealing to a person who knows far more about your course than you do, so don't be shy in trying to impress them with your knowledge. Show that you also know some stuff on the subject by giving specific examples of what you find interesting. Show off what you know by providing detailed examples that will be memorable or impressive to the reader or will even make them reminisce over the things they enjoy about their subject. Also, don't be afraid to give some opinions and views on topics (as long as you stay short, open-ended and uncontroversial. This shows you can think for yourself and that you have a deeper interest in your chosen course.
• A little fudging can go a long way. Telling a few white lies or enhancing the full truth can help be more persuasive. It's understandable if you feel like you don't have a lot to brag about considering you are still a young student with probably little tangible experience, who is just about to embark on their A levels. That was my thought and still often is. The expression 'everyone lies on their CV' is somewhat true and is relevant here as it is sometimes the requirement for a personal statement/cover letter etc. Embellish your experiences, examples and statements in a subtle and realistic way. 

Here is my own Personal Statement (for my Joint honours Political Science and Philosophy degree)  which can be used as an example, reference, template (whatever helps best):

My grandparents are English, Irish, Pakistani and Asian West Indian. It was intriguing to learn that how I came about was a direct result of many historical and political factors. The stories passed down to me about their early lives put a very personal face on the impact of the British Empire and resulted in me becoming very interested in the history behind their decisions. In retrospect, this was my first exposure to the effects of political decisions on everyday people.

As a young teenager, my interest in politics was further stirred when I read 'Animal Farm' by George Orwell - how easily the socialist ideal descended into totalitarianism started me thinking about how swiftly political systems can become corrupt through human nature. The conflict between power and morality, between the purity of an idea and the compromises involved in its implementation has fascinated me ever since. All political systems are rooted in ethical codes originating from religious and philosophical thinking about what is right or wrong. I like to examine ideologies behind political institutions and how every decision affects us both individually and collectively. One of my inspirations is Bertrand Russell whose 'Reith Lectures' raised my awareness of philosophy as a living part of the political process. His point that politics, economics and social organisation are not ends in themselves, but should exist "to bring a good life to the individuals who compose it" has made a huge impression on me. This led me to further explore his works and I was amazed at how prophetic he was in his analysis of China and that, 90 years ago, he foresaw the potential of China to become a superpower.
 
Amongst many lectures on Politics and Philosophy, one by Peter Vardy led me to question how powerful figures impose their morality on others. At a 'Youth Question Time', I participated in a political discussion articulating my views on topics such as War and Work Experience. I spoke of the general injustice of war, but acknowledged that in some cases it is the lesser of 2 evils (to defend or protect). A recent visit to Parliament allowed me to observe the House of Lords and the Commons and further heightened my interest in the current state of British Politics and its integral workings. Whilst there, I took part in a workshop on 'Crime, Punishment and Youth Unemployment', and defended my opinion that punishment must be coupled with rehabilitation in a debate against students from other schools.
 
During the summer of 2013, I worked in an international company specialising in banking investments for high earners in Malaysia. Interacting and speaking to those in international finance made me realise how political decisions impact on people's' life savings and their faith in financial institutions. I was struck at how quickly confidence in the supposedly stable banking world has crumbled resulting in an almost global recession.

As the Social Sciences Prefect, I organised 'Parliament Week' for the school. My aim was to increase awareness and interest in political affairs and to involve young people in politics. I organised differentiated interactive activities for all age groups which required me to coordinate and liaise with a team of people including staff members. The aptitude for this role was a result of skills I gained from a week-long leadership course and completing Duke of Edinburgh.
 
Outside of school, I am a part time carer for my autistic brother, and have volunteered at his Special Needs school. This has given me perspective and has taught me to be responsible, resilient and patient. I have completed a course in Makaton (a sign language for people with severe learning and language difficulties). I also enjoy Choi Kwang Do (a form of Martial Arts), which requires discipline, self control and persistence; I am currently a first degree black belt. I firmly believe that hard work yields results and this ethos drives everything I do.

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Updated beauty faves! What's in my everyday make-up routine

Well its been a long time since I sat down to write a blog post. I thought this would be an excellent time to share my updated makeup faves- especially considering the last time I wrote a beauty products review I was 19! (I'm 22 now). I love makeup but I definitely don't have the time in the morning now that I have a job to be extensive about it. My daily makeup look for work is to try and look natural, even-toned, glowy and like nothing can stress me out (so I swap the dewy/kinda sweaty look for more of a 'professional' matte finish). So...

•  I start with a primer. This is my first step but actually I don't consider it to be too important to achieve a look. It's sort of just a base in which to work the real magic onto. Because I don't think it's too necessary, I tend to opt for the cheapest options available. I am currently using COLLECTION 'PRIMED AND READY' MATTIFYING PORE MINIMISER (retailing for around £4.99). This works excellently in giving me that poreless matte finish to my foundation as it is silicone based and contains Witch Hazel which is meant to help fight acne. Now, I'm not so sure it is helping much with my breakouts but it is evening out the surface of them for better foundation application. I usually apply this with just my fingers to warm it up (helping to spread it) and to really work it in.

• L'OREAL 'TRUE MATCH SUPER-BLENDABLE FOUNDATION' (usually £9.99) works amazingly. It blends out seamlessly, has a lovely subtle shimmer for glow and comes in so many shades. With all the outcry for makeup companies to start being more inclusive of different skin types I think this foundation really paved the way as it was one of the first drugstore brands I heard of that truly looked varied. I wear 4N Beige and what's cool about it is that the shades even come in different undertones. I think I'm neutral (hence the N). This is also SPF 17 which is pretty good for a daily foundation in these sunnier months. I use my bareMinerals 'Perfecting face foundation brush' to put drops of liquid foundation into the centre 'reservoir' to stipple on and blend smaller areas. I use the NYX professional makeup 'Pro Dual Fibre foundation brush' to fully blend everything out.

• I like to give my face some more tone by using some bronzer/contour. Using the large angled bareMinerals 'Bare Escentuals Soft Curve Face & Cheek brush' I blend on my LAURA GELLER BAKED BRONZE N BRIGHTEN bronzer in Medium. It has a mix of dark contour shades, lighter shimmery bronzer, blush and highlighter; so an all-in-one kind of product. This makes it super practical in the morning to define and give some colour to my face. Just remember to bring this up further on the cheek rather than just the hollows of your cheekbones as it contains blusher and illuminator. This can be a little over £20 depending on where you buy it from but I get this on sale at my workplace as they sell this brand. These baked pressed powders are pretty darn good actually if your willing to spend a bit more.

• The LAURA GELLER 'BAKED HIGHLIGHTER DUO' in French Vanilla/Portofino is a great shimmery yet subtle glowy highlighter to add definition to the high points of your face without going too OTT. I use the mini version but the normal size usually retails for around £24. Again this is super subtle but is build-able to achieve a more luminescent look. I use a small angled brush so to angle it effectively and apply highlighter to different parts of the face.

• The last step is important but I find that anything usually will do. A finishing pressed powder is necessary to lock your look into place and I'm currently using the LAURA GELLER ' FILTER FINISH SETTING POWDER' in Universal. This isn't too heavy duty and so doesn't cake up your foundation- which is great for me as I'm super heavy-handed. It has a opalescent pearly finish and has a mix of colours in it to help colour correct the face. I tend to prefer a more mattifying and powdery setting power but this works well to give my face a fresher appearance. Its usually sold for around £25. If you're looking for a light but pearly setting powder, this is perfect but overall I think any pressed powder works just fine. I apply this with any large fluffy brush or my It Cosmetics 'Heavenly Luxe Airbrush Powder & Bronzer' brush. This has such a soft large brush head that its useful for applying the finishing touches to my routine and to blend out any harsh lines. 

These products have really helped me achieve a natural coverage that allows me to feel confident and look more 'polished' at work but by no means do I think its necessary. For me, I prefer to wear light makeup to work as it is just part of a professional attire to me as I always wear makeup to any formal occasion. I think basic concealing and evening out of skin tone is a practical and fast way to look put together in the morning even when you are feeling the exact opposite. I do wonder if I were to ever have a senior position anywhere if I would feel the need to 'up my makeup game' to look more the part but for now this look really just reflects where I am in my career- Fresh and new, kinda bored but trying at least LOL.

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Evaluating God's 'inability to sin'

[This blog post is an edited essay of mine from my first year at University of Birmingham©]

To evaluate an anti-theistic argument, one must first look at the classical theistic definition of God. “Classical theism is the notion of God as that which is absolutely metaphysically ultimate – a notion that encompasses both Anselm’s conception of God and the God-as-cause-of-the-world approach of Aquinas, Maimonides…and which accounts for the centrality of divine simplicity to classical theism.” (Feser 2010, paragraph 5). This definition encompasses divine attributes such as changelessness, omnibenevolence, omniscience, omnipotence, incorporeality and so on. It is the idea that God is perfect and so has no negative attributes. This would therefore mean He cannot sin, as this would be contrary to this definition. There are three main arguments against the theistic claims about God but my focus is on His inability to sin. I will evaluate how this argument works in undercutting God as an idea in itself.

The argument from God’s apparent inability to sin requires an evaluation of God’s own moral capability and so criticizes His very nature and power. God’s divine attributes are inconsistent as His omnipotence contradicts His incapability to sin, therefore He is limited, as “God is not only free from sin, He is incapable of moral deviation. God not only does not sin, He cannot sin. This is generally held to be part of what is communicated in the claim that God is perfectly good.” (Pike 1969, p208). This part of His being causes a major logical problem as it poses the question, how can God be both omnipotent and limited? This is a strong anti-theistic argument as it emphasizes the logical contradiction behind God’s very concept unless His definition were to change. However, in response to this, some would argue that God can be both omnipotent and able to sin as despite the fact we see this as a logical contradiction, God is beyond our understanding (as He is transcendent) and thus we cannot expect our understanding of logic, and therefore logical contradictions, to apply to him. This then allows for the fact that God is omnipotent and able to sin thus retaining his original definition. Arguably, this is allowing God to become reduced to a “death by a thousand qualifications” (Bolden quoting Flew 2012, p4) as theists continue to alter God in any way in order to coincide with their individual beliefs making it impossible to falsify (in theory). This argument comes from the ‘Parable of the Invisible Gardener’ by John Wisdom, in which God is comparable to the Gardener. It shows how theists will always give excuses to justify their beliefs and do not actually engage with the criticisms argued by anti-theists. This subjective modification does not allow anything to counter God and so reduces God to a meaningless concept, thus not providing an adequate solution to God’s inability to sin. Nevertheless, there are many other responses to this argument which counter anti-theistic reasoning.

As Anselm and Aquinas both argue, “to sin is to fall short of a perfect action." (Aquinas 1997, page unknown). This would mean that it is impossible for Him to sin as that would be an imperfection on His part. Sin is a human imperfection that can only affect them and not Him as He is the only perfect being. Sin is a deficient act, and as Aquinas puts it, the ability to sin is ‘falling short’ or lacking in perfection. Arguably, God cannot sin as He cannot be deficient in anything as He is perfect. However, part of His omnipotence is being able to do anything (even if it seems contrary to His concept). This would therefore mean He is limited and so an imperfect being as He cannot do something. However, part of being perfect is to have ultimate power (omnipotence) and so in theory He should be able to sin. The theistic counter argument falls short as it only proves that He still remains a logical contradiction and so can be called both perfect and imperfect as well as omnipotent and limited. Pike also argues that Aquinas and Anselm’s argument fails. He says

“Let us agree that to the extent that an individual is such that "adversity and perversity" can prevail against him, to that extent is he…morally weak. He is then capable of "falling short in action," i.e., of doing "what he ought not to do." So far as I can see, an individual that is able to bring about any consistently describable state of affairs might well be morally weak. I can find no conceptual difficulty in the idea of a diabolical omnipotent being.” (Pike 1969, p210).

God is thus not ‘perfectly good’ and so can be corrupted or already is, which would then also mean He may not be omnibenevolent. This fallibility allows for an ability to sin and destroys His classical theistic definition whilst also anthropomorphizing Him, further taking away from His divinity.

Others argue that challenging God on such a basis is ridiculous as “an individual would not qualify as perfectly good if he were to act in a morally reprehensible way. Thus, the statement "God acts in a morally reprehensible way" is logically incoherent. This is to say that "God sins" is a logical contradiction.”(Pike 1969, p209) Furthermore, He does not have to be able to do anything that is as absurd as this. Some maintain that sinning is something that is not within God’s nature and so makes no logical sense to argue that He cannot do it. To say ‘God sins’ is a nonsensical statement as if one were to say a ‘round square’. Arguably, this takes away from His transcendence. God is something that does not need to abide by our thinking and logic. Just because it does not make any logical sense to us, does not mean He cannot do it. If He is all powerful, He can do anything, even if it seems illogical to us. In this way He would be able to sin but therefore would not be perfect. We are not meant to be able to fully understand God and His ways so if there is a way that God can be all things, even a contradiction, this would then require a new definition of Him.

It is not possible to have all these divine properties be mutually consistent with each other and so the theistic definition and nature of God would be false. Anything said to falsify theistic statements are futile as God is constantly amended to not allow anything against Him, however this does not diminish the anti-theistic arguments itself; it rather reduces the impact of theistic arguments. Overall, this argument still offers major logical problems with God as a concept and could lead many people to a belief in a different kind of God and so not the one of classical theism.

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Bibliography

Edward Feser, Classical Theism, published in Blogspot, posted on September 30^th (2010), paragraph 5, http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2010/09/classical-theism.html.

Nelson Pike, American Philosophical Quarterly-Omnipotence and God’s Ability to Sin, published by University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications (1969), p208, p210, p209.

Micah-Sage Bolden (quoting Anthony Flew,) The Meaningfulness of Religious Language: Addressing the Challenges of Falsification and Verification, for King University, uploaded onto academia.edu (2012), p4.

St Thomas Aquinas, The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, edited by Anton C. Pegis, published by Hackett Publishing Company (1997), page unknown.

     

Evaluating 'liberalism'- with reference to Jeremy Bentham

[This blog post is an edited essay of mine from my second year at University of Birmingham©]

Jeremy Bentham argued for an alternative to ‘rights-based liberalism’ in the form of Utilitarianism. His principle of utility is that which “approves or disapproves of every action…according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question” (Bentham 1988, p2) using it in regard to, “not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government” (Bentham 1988, p2), deriving political implications from his philosophical commitments in ideology. His new form of liberalism represented the ‘Enlightenment’ of 18^th century England, offering secularity as well as applying scientific methods to the study of society, within ascending theses of government. Through deductive reasoning and observing the natural world, he concluded that the best form of government is one that most closely follows his principle of utility. Bentham’s philosophical ideology and commitments are the foundation for his political reformation of liberalism.

The two philosophical commitments that influence Bentham’s political thoughts are Hedonism and Consequentialism. Hedonism is the idea that “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as determine what we shall do” (Bentham 1988, p1),  meaning humans are ultimately ‘pleasure-seekers’ and ‘pain-avoiders’(as  observed) and it is this prescription that should be followed as our main motivation or deterrent. Consequentialism justifies a proposed action’s rightness or wrongness on the basis of its likely outcome. This teleological principle is called ‘act consequentialism’ with “the claim that an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good…if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act available to the agent” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2015, part I). These concepts are the source of Bentham’s majoritarian ideology, which argues that an effective government should only carry out acts that end in the intrinsic good or pleasure for most people. This philosophical position has many political implications on specific aspects of liberalism such as rights, social contract theory, community and democracy.

Bentham rejects many ideas usually associated with liberalism. He argues that ‘natural rights’ are ambiguous and considers it to be "simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,-nonsense upon stilts." (Bentham 1843, page unknown). Rights are “the fruits of the law, and of the law alone. There are no rights without law-no rights contrary to the law-no rights anterior to the law.” (Bentham 2005, page unknown). Governments need to be able to enforce rights within laws to make it a legitimate concept otherwise it will hold little meaning. It is his opinion that “moral and natural rights are mischievous fictions and anarchical fallacies that encourage civil unrest, disobedience and resistance to laws, and revolution against established governments” (Smith 2012, paragraph 7). He also rejects Social Contract Theory as both inefficient and fictitious because it is subjective and usually lacks a rational foundation whilst also being adverse to the principle of utility. Bentham believes we obey these social contracts “so long as the probable mischiefs of obedience are less than the probable mischiefs of resistance” (Parekh quoting Bentham 1993, p545). He maintains that this is insufficient enough reason to obey such arbitrary contracts that promise certain things but in actuality, produces no observable advantage. Similarly, he also proposes that the idea of community is fictitious as it is composed of many individuals yet considered and counted as members of a ‘whole’. Bentham grants that the collective sum of interests will not always please all equally (being contradictory interests at times) however, government should still strive to implement it by the use of a ‘cost-benefit analysis model’ through his ‘hedonic calculus’. He acknowledges that the use of the word ‘community’ is often confusing and that there are conflicts between the interests of the individual and the collective, but the need to please the many outweighs the need to please the few (majoritarian view). His calculus takes into account intensity, duration, propinquity, certainty, fecundity, purity and extent in order to maximise the happiness of the most amount of people in the community. He favours representative democracy as it suits his ‘greatest happiness principle’ the closest on the basis of the subsequent accountability this form offers over public institutions.  The people are thus “protected from the authoritarian tendencies of state authorities not by a bill of constitutional rights but by a set of enhanced democratic powers that enable them to exercise strict control over their elected representatives” (Peonidis 2011, page unknown) through representative democracy. Nonetheless, it is the view that rights are there solely to protect people’s freedom which is paramount to liberalism, whilst a social contract both acknowledges and aims to enforce those rights. It seems counter intuitive to liberalism to reject these positive ideals. Thus, Bentham’s alternative approach to liberalism is met with various criticisms due to its inherent weaknesses.

There are an abundance of downfalls and disadvantages to his approach. Firstly, it is arguable that his approach is not susceptible to any direct proof and so it cannot be said that it works or it should work. The ‘hedonic calculus’ ignores human intentions behind any action, thus “there are no ‘bad’ motives, only ‘bad’ calculations, implying, no person is responsible for his or her own behaviour. In effect, the idea being promoted is that “human action is essentially the same as that of a machine in operation.” (Cleveland 2002, section B). The calculus is also too difficult and (at times) tedious to apply to every type of governmental situation, especially as it requires consequentialism; it is not always possible to predict the future of a proposed action. Hedonism mistakenly excludes altruism from all human motivation, making egoism the ‘new morality’ behind his approach to liberalism when “We should want others to be altruistic, to endorse altruism, and to endorse the endorsement of both of these behaviours (altruism and morality)” (Baron 2003, p1142). Excluding this as an important feature behind political decision making would lead to corrupt attitudes towards state rule. This also erases all moral choice (our moral compass) over political matters as it removes freedom of thought in favour of pre-established rules and principles. Hedonism is not a reliable guide in which government should conduct themselves and others.

There are also rival accounts such as the principles of asceticism, sympathy and antipathy. The inverse of the utility principle is asceticism, meaning one ought to do the act that brings about the least pleasure for the most amount of people. This stance is mostly embraced by religionists and moralists who endorse strict discipline contrary to Bentham’s principle. This shows evidence of people not abiding the idea that we only seek pleasure, therefore demonstrating how this approach to liberalism would not work with certain types of people. The latter principle is the reliance of emotional application through our intuitions, conscience and feelings. This shows how people do not always have a concrete tendency to always want to produce happiness but instead subjectively approves or disproves of an action by their own judgement and not by any other general principle. A person’s sentimental opinion can be their only reasoning behind a specific action and this is often used as a way of understanding whether something is right or wrong in political systems. Rather than abide a general rule, there are various ways people use this principle, such as ‘moral or common sense’, “an eternal and immutable Rule of Right”, the ‘Law of Nature or Reason’, “an understanding (of right and wrong)”, an ‘unavoidable truth’, the “Fitness of Things”, the ‘Doctrine of Election’ and the “score of (it) being unnatural” (Bentham 1988, p17-18).

Bentham’s response to the principle of asceticism is that those who follow this are replacing pain and pleasure with fear and hope as “fear is more powerful than hope… (thus) the parties and their motives (are) different, (yet) the principle the same.” (Bentham 1988, p9).  In living a strict and disciplined life, one is aspiring for long term pleasure and so is still in pursuit of happiness but in the opposite manner. He also explicated how the use of the principle of antipathy and sympathy can be manipulative and cruel, making one “accept…the author’s sentiment or opinion as reason for itself” (Bentham 1988, p17) when the “mischief common to all these ways of thinking and arguing…is then serving as a cloak, and pretence, and ailment, to despotism”(Bentham 1988, p19).

Many politicians and philosophers disagree with his approach, including Kant on the basis of his deontological ‘categorical imperative’. Kant enforces the importance of duty behind actions in his statement “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” (Beck quoting Kant 1969, p44). This unconditional law applies to all rational beings and is independent from personal desires so there is no pursuit of end goals like there is with Bentham’s approach. Actions are intrinsically right or wrong for Kant and in his opinion, humans should not be treated as a means to an end, as with utilitarianism. Consequences are beyond people’s control most of the time and so it should not be given such significance as with Bentham’s approach. In treating humans as ‘ends in themselves’, decisions are made in accordance with respecting and upholding positive goals for all of humanity. This is one of the strongest objections to Bentham’s utilitarian approach as it highlights major flaws in his reasoning over what is right and wrong in human nature, rendering it too fallible for use as a guide in liberal political decision making. Bentham’s approach lacks empathy and so could encourage greed inside big businesses and corporations. Yet, there are some strengths within his approach that make it a valid liberal theory.

He refutes these criticisms successfully further showing how his utility principle would uphold liberalism within government more logically and efficiently than other principles. In addition, his hedonic calculus can be used effectively at times and offers clarity to decision making through easy application. He argues that there is indirect proof for his approach through ‘psychological proof’. It is an undeniable fact that humans seek pleasure and avoid pain and this cannot be questioned being innate even if it is only subconscious. Bentham explains that when using something that proves all else, that something cannot itself be proven as there is only “a chain of proofs (that) must have their commencement somewhere” and that it is both “impossible” and “needless” to give such proof of it (Bentham 1988, p4). This justification is arguably weak and subject to different opinions however it still stands as an empirical, clear and practical system of thought that upholds many liberal features.

Bentham’s approach to liberalism is a logical yet unstable and unproven theory. It may offer a clear, pragmatic and more realistic approach than other more idealistic versions, benefiting certain political institutions (with the protection of human rights thus limiting its power) nevertheless, it is not the best system to govern a state. Corrupt political individuals could manipulate situations to suggest a path leads to greater happiness than it would in actuality (through teleological decision making). It could encourage greedy corporations to ignore their worker’s needs in order to appease the demands of more people, as well as allowing the tyranny of the majority, which has been disastrous for liberal thinking in the past (slavery being an example). His philosophy erodes liberalism with the lack of moral choice also treating people as a means to an end. From a liberal perspective, his assessment of human nature is too basic, mechanical and unfeeling to be the foundation of a governmental system, whilst his political views reject too many core liberal values aiming solely in protecting the public and its pluralist nature.

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Bibliography

Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, published by Amherst NY Prometheus Books (1988), Chapter I-part II p2, part I p1, part XI p4,Chapter II- part XIV-XV p17-18, part V p9, part XV p19.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism-Classic Utilitarianism, published in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015), part 1.

Jeremy Bentham, Critique of the Doctrine of Inalienable, Natural Rights in Anarchical Fallacies, published by Edinburgh: William Tait (1843), edited by John Bowring, Volume 2, article II part 3 paragraph 5, page unknown.

Jeremy Bentham, Pannomial Fragments, republished by Blackmask Online (2005), Chapter III-Expositions, page unknown.

George H. Smith, Jeremy Bentham’s Attack on Natural Rights, posted onto libertarianism.org (June 26^th 2012), paragraph 7, http://www.libertarianism.org/publications/essays/excursions/jeremy-benthams-attack-natural-rights.

Bhikhu C. Parekh, Jeremy Bentham: Critical Assessments, Volume 3- Law and Politics, published by Routledge (1993), p545.

Filimon Peonidis, Jeremy Bentham's ‘unusually liberal’ representative democracy in History of European Ideas, published by Elsevier Ltd (2011), page unknown.

Paul A. Cleveland, The Failure of Utilitarian Ethics in Political Economy, published in The Journal of Private Enterprise by The Independent Institute (2002), section B.

Johnathan Baron, Value Analysis of Political Behaviour-Self-interested: Moralistic: Altruistic: Moral, published by University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2003), section B p1142. 

Lewis White Beck, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals: text and critical essays, edited by Robert Paul Wolff, published by Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill (1969), p44.

Analysing an argument against abortion- with reference to Don Marquis

 

[This blog post is an edited essay of mine from my second year at University of Birmingham©]

Don Marquis’s argument against abortion is strong as it assumes that the life of a foetus is as important and valuable as any other human being because of its potential for fulfilling its own future. He uses secular logical reasoning to conclude that this can only mean that abortion in most cases is wholly immoral as it would deprive the foetus of a said future. It may stand as a strong and compelling argument however it does not succeed in its persuasiveness to many moderates and permissive people, since one would have to first agree with his premise that abortion, in every instance, is the deprivation of a human’s future. Many even argue that a foetus’s potential happy future is not entirely enough to force a woman to bear an unwanted child or, that a foetus has not yet experienced life enough, to be deprived of anything at all. It also fails to give ample reasons to justifiably deem abortion as impermissible. I will argue in favour of his critics in order to demonstrate how his argument is not wholly successful. To begin, I will set out his argument and describe how it explains the immorality and thus, impermissibility of abortion.

In brief, Marquis equates the wrongness of killing innocent human beings to the ‘wrongness’ of killing fetuses. He explains that “the future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of adult human beings and are identical to the futures of young children. Since the reason that is sufficient to explain why it is wrong to kill human beings after the time of birth is a reason that also applies to fetuses, it follows that abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong.” (Marquis 1989, p192). He explains that his moral category is not about ‘personhood’ which many anti-abortionists use in their arguments, but about the foetus having just as valuable a future as anyone else, “a future-like-ours.”(Marquis 1989, p194). He adopts the argument against the wanton infliction of pain on animals (which most moral people would agree with) to support his argument against abortion by stating that both arguments are structurally the same, “Both recognize that the wrong-making feature of these immoral actions is a property of actions sometimes directed at individuals other than postnatal human beings.” (Marquis 1989, p193). It is important to note that he believes that “abortion could be justified in some circumstances, only if the loss consequent on failing to abort would be at least as great.” (Marquis 1989, p194). This argument proves to be one of the strongest anti-abortion arguments for a plethora of reasons.

It succeeds in being one of the most secular pro-life arguments, which means it can be debated effectively with other people who do not share the same religious assumptions and avoid any “irrational religious dogma” (Marquis 1989, p183). It very adequately supports conservative beliefs and evades discussing the highly debatable and subjective matter of the ‘rights’ of the unborn human, thus avoiding the questionable ‘potential person’ argument. He circumvents usual anti-abortionist notions such as ‘personhood’, which is too individualistic, equivocal and problematic to use in a successful argument. This all makes for a more convincing argument, the premise itself being extremely plausible; it is therefore difficult to fully deny that in aborting a foetus, you are also (in some way) exterminating its potential future. Many agree that “The argument can be shown to be valid in standard modern predicate logic.” (Marquis 2002, p201) because they hold the belief that “What would make killing me now wrong is the harm it would do to me: it would deprive me, who am juridically innocent, of life… (Abortion) would have exactly the same victim as killing me now would.” (Pruss 2011, p177). Marquis and a critic of his argument, Peter Singer, both agree upon the deficiency of the traditionalist ‘sanctity of life’ argument in addition to also believing that a correct view of the foetus cannot be ‘speciesist’ because stating we are valuable just because we are human, is giving us special rights that have no real foundation to it. Nevertheless, there remains (as Singer and other critics point out) many issues with Marquis’s argument against abortion.

Singer debated with Marquis over infants and fetuses alike not actually having any property to make killing them wrong. Marquis explained that everyone has the basic human right to life and survival and because a foetus is a human organism, it has the same right. Firstly, this goes against Marquis avoiding ‘rights’ in his argument. Secondly, Singer demonstrated that this causes implausible consequences. If everyone has a right to life, then they are due a degree of reasonable care to sustain them, therefore we have an obligation to care for people in order to increase and give them the best chance of survival. This is not deemed generally acceptable as it could lead to an onerous degree of care. He favours a preference based view and uses the ‘desire account’ to explain that if one violates someone’s rights, one is frustrating their desire for that thing. No foetus has a concept of itself as a continuing subject of experience and so cannot have a desire to continue to exist. Marquis tried to show how this would mean it would be morally permissible to kill anyone who does not have a desire to live (such as the suicidal), which is not commonly accepted and is immoral. Desire does not amount to rights and so Singer’s account is unsound. He states that the foetus can have ‘ideal desires’ (what they would want) but because of the handicap of being underdeveloped cannot fully understand its future. He maintained that we should take the ‘best interests’ of a human being into account. In the same way that we would not kill a temporarily unconscious person because it would not be in their interests, we should also not abort any foetus. Singer argues that it is impossible to harm foetuses as they are only potentially sentient beings and that Marquis’s response of the act-omission distinction and potentiality is morally irrelevant. Surely then one should refrain from sex so to not bring about unwanted children as it is not in the interests of the parents nor the child’s. We can abort foetuses as they have no awareness of their existence or have any preferences as we know it. If a suicidal person has no desire to live, even though they have tried to recover, their sufferings make their future of no value to them and so has the right to death. Foetuses have no desires as we know of and it being underdeveloped is not a handicap in the same way depression is for the suicidal; it is a natural stage of the development of the embryo which all humans go through. Marquis ends with the notion that when the placenta is formed and the cells have divided, it is an individual which should not be killed. Nevertheless, this brings Singer to the supposition that we should then have to scientifically separate embryonic cells into multiple ones in order to bring about twins, so to allow all the cells to become individuals with futures. The ‘future of value theory’ would seem to make it our obligation to create an infinite number of beings as they all have valuable futures. He states that this is preposterous and uses reductio ad absurdum to come to the conclusion that Marquis’s argument is weak and makes too many assumptions based on his own beliefs, whilst also not offering any account of when we begin to exist in order to justify when is it impermissible to kill us. We are not just human organisms, but embodied minds with the capacity for mental activity that fetuses cannot yet achieve. Singer adequately shows Marquis’s theory to be unsuccessful in its overall argument. (Singer and Marquis 2006).

Robert Lovering claims Marquis’s argument is “not different (to a traditional approach) as it involves the concept of a person…futures are valuable insofar as they are not only dominated by goods of consciousness, but are experienced by psychologically continuous persons…a normal foetus, at least during the first trimester, is not a person. Thus, during that stage of development it is not capable of experiencing its future as a psychologically continuous person…hence it does not have a future of value.” (Lovering 2005, p131). In order to have a valuable ‘future like ours’, one must be somewhat of a person with consciousness and so an embryo or early foetus does not have as valuable a future as people do. It is even argued that “A living human cell that might be stimulated to develop into a clone of a person does not now have a personal future. A fetus similarly has only the potentiality to develop a personal future. For this reason, killing a fetus is morally very different from killing a normal adult human.” (Norcross quoting Mcinerney 1990, p268). This attacks Marquis’s first premise by claiming that we are only taking away the foetuses potential to have a personal ‘future like ours’ as it does not yet have one. This is not the same as depriving a human of their actual personal future as they had been experiencing theirs in actuality, not potentiality. Marquis also does not state when the loss experienced by the mother can be as great as the ‘loss’ experienced by the foetus. Any woman who is forced to have a child she does not want is an extreme loss for her, thus one cannot say the loss for the unborn foetus is larger than the loss experienced by an adult who undoubtedly has interests, rights and preferences for her life. “This seems to be a kind of equivocation… (One) cannot tell whether Marquis refers to moral losses or to neutral losses.” (Sinnott-Armstrong 1997, p63). Despite the weaknesses of Marquis’s theory, there still stands the argument that a woman has more rights over her body than a foetus has over her body. There is so much focus put on the foetus’s life but in denying a woman an abortion, one “refuse(s) to grant to the mother that very status of person which is so firmly insisted on for the fetus.” (Thomson 1971, p52). For this reason, even if Marquis succeeded in his argument as well as he had hoped, it still does not give enough reason to rule abortion as impermissible in most cases.

Marquis’s argument stands as a plausible, detailed and sophisticated theory but does not succeed in showing how abortion in most cases is impermissible. Many deny that his first premise of ‘what makes killing a human wrong’ is wholly correct, whilst others do not accept this as reason enough to deny a woman an abortion. The anti-abortion argument will always falter to most liberal permissive people as it denies the rights and autonomy of a fully conscious, sentient and recognised ‘person’. For the main reason that a foetus is not yet experiencing life (as we know and understand it) in actuality like the mother is, Marquis’s argument against abortion is not successful in its aim.

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Bibliography

Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral (vol.86 no.4), published by The Journal of Philosophy Inc. (1989), pages 192,193,194.

Don Marquis, A defence of the potential future of value theory (debate), published by J Med Ethics (2002), page 201.

Alexander R. Pruss, I Was Once a Fetus: That is Why Abortion is wrong (Chapter 2) from Persons Moral Worth and Embryos, published by Springer Netherlands (2011), page177.

Lodp, online video on Abortion and Infanticide: Peter Singer debates Don Marquis (03/29/2006), uploaded onto youtube.com (2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Qfiq18DMYk, [Accessed: 29/02/2016].

Robert P. Lovering, Does a Normal Foetus really have a future of value? A reply to Marquis (Vol. 19 No. 2), published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (2005), page 131.

Alastair Norcross quoting Peter K. Mcinerney, Killing, Abortion, and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis (Vol. 87, No. 5), published by Journal of Philosophy Inc. (1990), page 268.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, You Can’t Lose What You Ain’t Never Had: A Reply to Marquis on Abortion from Philosophical Studies, published by Kluwer Academic Publishers (1997), page 63.

Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defence of Abortion from Philosophy & Public Affairs (Vol. 1, No. 1) published by Wiley (1971), page 52.

Analysing the 'wrongness of homosexual conduct'- with reference to John Finnis

[This blog post is an edited essay of mine from my second year at University of Birmingham©]

John Finnis’s argument uses reasoning and ideas from ancient and modern writings, even claiming that religious, non-religious, philosophical and non-philosophical people alike can relate to and understand his argument. However popular it holds with traditionalists arguing against same sex relationships, it is not an indisputably correct argument. I will illustrate how his argument fails within its reasoning. What must be clearly defined is his narrow concept of ‘marital sex’ which is the loving, committed and unifying genital intercourse between a man and woman only, either inside or outside lawful marriage. This means that alternative sexual activity are not considered marital and therefore deemed not ‘real and good’. His opinions attempt at being secular to avoid being criticised as a somewhat limited, old fashioned theological ideology. I will comment first on the strengths and least disputable points, progressing to the core weaknesses that make the argument unconvincing.

Finnis makes clear that he is not judging homosexuals as immoral, “To discriminate against a person on the basis of ‘a psychological or psychosomatic disposition inwardly orienting one towards homosexual activity’” (Perry quoting Finnis 1995, p42). He asserts that it would be wrong for any state to criminalize homosexuality on the basis that “a conception of the proper role of government exclude(s) the state from assuming a directly parental disciplinary role in relation to consenting adults.” (Finnis 1994, p1052) even saying the government should not deem homosexuality as immoral and discourage the public from such activities as long as it does not extend into the “public realm” (Finnis 1994, p1053). These statements are agreeable and does not denote homosexuality in a negative way. Similarly, he explains that “it is not in dispute that homosexual conduct…like heterosexual conduct between consenting adults, can be morally bad…unworthy of one who would be truly, fully human.”(Perry 1995, p43). He treats homosexuals and heterosexuals equally if their relationships are for example “manipulative, exploitative, unfaithful, or compulsive.”(Perry 1995, p43). Arguably, in saying this, he is not unfairly attacking just homosexuals, but all relationships that does not fit his idea of ‘wholesome sexual relations’. Overall Finnis’ argument follows from its premise (if his definition of ‘marital’ is accepted) logically therefore making for a valid theory. However there are many questionable points within it that negates it as a fully sound argument.

Finnis states that marital sex consists of a “single reality with two blessings (children and mutual affection). Non-marital intercourse including homosexual, has no such point and therefore is unacceptable.”(Finnis 1994, p1064). He classes sterile couples as still marital because “they have not only the generosity of acts of friendship but also the procreative significance, not necessarily of being intended to generate or capable in the circumstances of generating but at least of being…acts of the reproductive kind” (Finnis 1994, p1067). This implies that any sexual act that is not genital intercourse is wrong. Finnis overlooks or simply ignores couples who have difficulty with genital intercourse due to a health problem or a physical or mental handicap that prevents performance. Their recourse is to develop new ways of exploring intimacy which will both strengthen and invigorate their relationship. They should not be considered any less ‘marital’ or ‘good’. Using Finnis’s argument would mean “the acts of a husband and wife whose intercourse is masturbatory, for example sodomitic or by fellatio or coitus interruptus (would) not consummate a marriage, because in reality (whatever the couple's illusions of intimacy and self-giving in such acts) they do not actualize the one-flesh, two-part marital good.” (Finnis 1994, p1068). This not only demoralizes couples who struggle with genital intercourse, but also removes the autonomy couples enjoy when choosing when or if they want to conceive children with ‘coitus interruptus’ or contraceptive methods. It is an outdated idea that it is immoral for couples who decide to forgo having children, perhaps due to financial instability or pursuing a busy career, yet Finnis does not account for this. If he were to include these other situations as sometimes necessary or preferable, he would then have to concede to also accept homosexual conduct as just another expression of sexuality and intimacy in a different lifestyle. Nevertheless he still argues that homosexuality is wrong and as impermissible as other sexual acts as if it were all sexually deviant.

Finnis compares homosexual conduct to acts which he finds just concupiscent and illusions of a ‘real good’, “in reality, whatever the generous hopes and dreams and thoughts of giving…some same-sex partners may surround their sexual acts…cannot express or do more than is expressed or done if two strangers engage in such activity to give each other pleasure, or a prostitute pleasures a client…in return for money…” (Finnis 1994, p1067). To say that homosexual sex is the same as other acts that are not (in these instances) out of love would be an invalid statement as some, in fact, are. Finnis claims that if a homosexual couple believe they are having significant and unifying marital sex, then this is just an ‘illusion’ of the real good that humans can only experience with a loving heterosexual relationship. He reaffirms that “one may never intend to destroy, damage, impede, or violate any basic human good, or prefer an illusory instantiation of a basic human good to a real instantiation…”(Finnis 1994, p1069). If a long term homosexual couple believe themselves to be in a committed and meaningful relationship then their ‘good’ is personally real to them and constitutes as a ‘single reality’ in which they can “actualize and experience their marriage” (Finnis 1994, p1064). Just as an infertile heterosexual couple can do this without the need for the blessing of biological children, homosexual couples can copulate with the blessing of mutual affection alone. In reality, not only can “a homosexual couple…achieve the bonds of mutual affection and emotional commitment through marriage (but) in denying it to them they are denied these goods. Thus, deeming those unions impermissible fails to respect the basic goods that could have been achieved…even if it also protects other basic goods.”(Danahar 2012, paragraph 18). One could argue that by denying and thus failing to respect these basic goods, Finnis is indirectly ‘damaging or impeding’ them in some way. If a homosexual couple does consider themselves to have marital sex (in all senses but procreative) then how can Finnis argue otherwise when he maintains that sterile couples are marital? He uses biology to justify his claims.

Just as sterile couples have the reproductive organs to procreate but is impaired in some way, homosexual couples also have functioning reproductive organs which because of their orientation, obstructs them from reproducing. In both cases, whether it is their biological health or sexual orientation, parenthood is still available to both couples through adoption and IVF. In essence, homosexual couples can still experience this ‘basic human good’. However careful Finnis is not to “infer normative conclusions … from non-normative (natural fact) premises” (Finnis 1994, p1068), he still treats his claims as if they were as persuasive and evidential as facts. Inferring correct behaviour in humans from animals is problematic in itself, nevertheless, it does aid in explaining natural urges and biological instincts. “In reality, many species engage in homosexual behaviours… (Thus) are obviously not in immediate pursuit of reproductive goals” (Vasey and Sommer 2006, p4). Additionally, many animals often engage in oral and masturbatory sex, cementing the conclusion that it is instinctual and natural for mammalian sex to include various other acts, contradicting Finnis’ opposition on the grounds of nature and biology. There are possible reasons why such activities present themselves in nature for example in strengthening intra-species bonding in order to aid survival or satisfying sexual urges without having to always procreate. Similarly, non-reproductive activities including homosexual sex in humans can be viewed as natural and evolutionary, maybe even to help decrease overpopulation. The ‘genuine unity’ experienced by heterosexual partners can be actualized just as well in homosexual partners as they are still naturally ‘biologically unified’ in their sexual conduct evidenced through other species. The male prostate gland and female clitoris can be some of the biological ways in which humans have evolved to experience same sex relations in a ‘real’ and intimate way, just as heterosexual couples can with reproductive intercourse. Finnis’s argument, at best, could show how homosexual conduct is not preferable (as they have no procreative significance), yet it is too weak and unconvincing to make such a large jump to being impermissible.

Finnis’s argument for the wrongness of homosexual conduct would be the most influential and persuasive to religious groups rather than secularists because it enforces the ‘correct role’ of a traditional marriage without using empirical evidence to substantiate his claims, almost like using faith as observable proof. In trying to be secular, but having a specific worldview (Roman Catholic), he has manipulated his argument to avoid criticisms, to the point where it fails being strong and resounding. It has too many disputable points as well as leaping from explaining how homosexual activity could be considered inconvenient or undesirable to being wholly unacceptable.

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Bibliography

Michael J. Perry (quoting John Finnis), The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A Response to John Finnis, Symposium on Sexual Orientation(Volume 9 Issue 1), published by Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy (1995), part I p42, p43.

John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation", published by Scholarly Works (Paper 205) in Notre Dame Law School (1994), part II p1052, p1053 and part V p1064, p1067, p1068, p1069.

John Danahar, Philosophical Disquisitions-New Natural Law, Homosexuality and Religion (part one), posted onto BlogSpot (October 19^th 2012), paragraph 18, http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.co.uk/2012/10/new-natural-law-homosexuality-and.html.

Volker Sommer and Paul L. Vasey, Homosexual Behaviour in Animals: An Evolutionary Perspective- topics, hypotheses and research trajectories, published by Cambridge University Press (2006), p4.